 Poster: A snowHead
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@SnoodyMcFlude, "it doesn't usually slide so it will be ok". I'd be critical of recreational skiers saying that, let alone "professionals".
"We don't get enough experience with high risk days". Well here's an idea, if you don't have experience when danger is that high expect the worse and go super conservative.
If this is the standard of professional guiding I'll take my chances  . Last week was 4/5 here and that was enough for even those of us with only a basic understanding to know maybe avoid anything close to 30 even if 99% of the time it's ok.
Edit: anyone that's done Avy1 the most basic avalanche course in Canada, doesn't ski that slope with that avalanche forecast. There's simply no defence.
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Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
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| SnoodyMcFlude wrote: |
| @boarder2020, I thought he explained quite clearly how experienced professionals can make those mistakes. That's not excusing it of course. |
My understanding is that they were not skiing the slope but were traversing out on the valley floor and were hit by the avalanche in the run off area. Did they remote trigger it or was it just terrible timing? Seems it’s very rare for that particular slope to avalanche (the guide says old growth forest avis are very rare) but the combo of a very bad weak layer and huge amounts of fresh snow created an anomaly.
Seems they did have an alternative route out but it was much longer and there’s a suspicion (in the comments) that commercial pressure came into play
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Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
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They were on the valley floor; the incident location is shown on the map at 1:23 in the video.
And it looks as though they were deliberately avoiding the "normal" winter route from the cabins to/from the Castle Peak trailhead, shown here: https://www.truckeedonnerlandtrust.org/frog-winter-routes . That route is acknowledged to have avalanche risks, so it looks as though instead of heading west from the cabins directly up to the Notch they had followed the trail over the saddle to the north and were then heading west up the valley. But, sadly, beneath the steep north-facing slopes.
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The week before last (14th-20th) I was with a Ski Club group skiing off-piste based in Chamonix. Despite the avalanche danger being 4-5 we had good skiing every day despite large parts of the valley being shut (including on one day the actual road between Argentierre and Le Tour). On two days this was achieved by going around the corner to St Gervais - skiing fairly much everything there. Needless to say, the snow was fabulous - even face-shots at times. (I didn't ski the last two days having broken a rib tree-skiing, hitting a broken branch stub I hadn't seen in the snow storm with misted goggles. As someone commented, an eventful year after being in an avalanche before Christmas.)
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Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
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| boarder2020 wrote: |
| I'm not so sure "interesting", more like completely damning. The forecast pretty much predicted it perfectly. They skied >30 on level 4 day. It's implied they didn't ski one at a time. How can 3 "professional" guides make such stupid mistakes? |
4 guides.
| boarder2020 wrote: |
| @SnoodyMcFlude, "it doesn't usually slide so it will be ok". I'd be critical of recreational skiers saying that, let alone "professionals". |
I’m not sure where that quote comes from. Certainly not from the guides (3 of them are dead, the surviving one hasn’t made any public appearence)
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If this is the standard of professional guiding I'll take my chances . Last week was 4/5 here and that was enough for even those of us with only a basic understanding to know maybe avoid anything close to 30 even if 99% of the time it's ok.
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In software engineering, we have a saying “to err is human, but to really screw things up, it takes a computer”.
That saying kept repeating in my head since I learnt of that incident. “Death in avalanche happens, but to have a high death toll in avalanche, it takes a guide” 
Granted, private parties don’t go out in large groups. So the stat is biased.
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| "We don't get enough experience with high risk days". Well here's an idea, if you don't have experience when danger is that high expect the worse and go super conservative. |
I think this being the key point. We THINK we had figured out “snow science”, a term that got thrown around a lot. But we only studied the “typical”, “normal” avalanches (because that’s the majority of the data available to be “studied”). So we really don’t know enough about high risk days (beyond it being “high risk”).
Another point he spent some time making (but unfortunately will likely be forgotten by most shortly) is, with the accelerated climate change, high risk days happens a lot more frequently now. Keep that in mind when your off-piste holiday got curtaile…
Last edited by Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do. on Mon 2-03-26 17:10; edited 1 time in total
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If people set off on a route they correctly calculate carries only a low risk, a fatal avalanche doesn't mean they got that wrong.
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Hmm… but if there’s a mass casualty, that definitely mean they got that wrong.
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@boarder2020, like I said, it doesn't excuse it but it does explain why experienced people may make what, to someone who wasn't there and has the benefit of hindsight, may look stupid. More so when considering the other comments here providing great context.
I think it's worth being critical about the decisions, hopefully so others might be more cautious about making the same mistakes. Possibly being critical of those who were victims probably serves less purpose.
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You'll get to see more forums and be part of the best ski club on the net.
You'll get to see more forums and be part of the best ski club on the net.
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| Origen wrote: |
| If people set off on a route they correctly calculate carries only a low risk, a fatal avalanche doesn't mean they got that wrong. |
Avi 4 day, traversing through a terrain trap with a recently heavily loaded slope above you, without conservative spacing. Even if you’d get away with it 99 times out of 100 points to some questionable judgement in terrain selection and group management
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snowHeads are a friendly bunch.
snowHeads are a friendly bunch.
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| BobinCH wrote: |
Seems they did have an alternative route out but it was much longer and there’s a suspicion (in the comments) that commercial pressure came into play
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So soon after the incident, with so little actual information, the suggestion of “commercial pressure” feels rather disrespectful to me.
Guides are human too. They value their own life. Besides, dead clients are bad for business. So to suggest commercial pressure might be a bit harsh?
Clearly, mistake in judgement were made. So many died. So sad. But I think it’s too early and too rash to start speculating on motives behind those judgements.
I wouldn’t be surprised that when more information comes out, there’re a mixture of multiple factors at play.
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And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
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Harrowing story
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Read the NYT article I just posted.
I think one of the critical variables was lack of visibility. The guides chose an alternative exit route that they or their betters at HQ deemed to be safe. They were on a 20° slope when they were hit from above. Due to strong wind and heavy snowfall, sounds like the guides might not have been able to see the threat that was above them. And if it was a route they weren't familiar with (because the usual routes they did know were deemed too dangerous), then it's possible they simply didn't see the threat they were traversing under.
Of course, that begs the question - IF they got that alternative 'safe' route from HQ during their morning guide planning meeting while still at the cabins, were the people from HQ who were advising them also unaware of the terrain they were sending them through??
Also, according to the article large groups seem to be most susceptible to judgement fails. Cf, Stevens Pass/Tunnel Creek avalanche. Here's a 10 min video narrative from some survivors of that one: https://www.nytimes.com/video/sports/100000001957178/the-avalanche-at-tunnel-creek.html?smid=url-share
Not sure if everyone can access that or not - no gift link that I could find. Be sure to click on the sound (speaker icon on right).
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You know it makes sense.
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| Quote: |
I think this being the key point. We THINK we had figured out “snow science”, a term that got thrown around a lot. But we only studied the “typical”, “normal” avalanches (because that’s the majority of the data available to be “studied”). So we really don’t know enough about high risk days (beyond it being “high risk”).
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Well the avalanche forecast pretty much predicted there was risk of that exact slope naturally sliding. Show me where the forecast has been dramatically wrong in recent history and I'll concede your point that our understanding of snow science is not good. Look at the avalanche death reports and you will see the deaths are 99% easily avoidable human errors and that the avalanche forecast accurately predicts the problems in the snowpack that caused the slide (and usually has the day at 3 or 4 out of 5 for risk).
It's not like we see different type of avalanches on high risk days. It's literally just what it says - increased risk. On level 4 days you simply avoid all avalanche terrain (that includes overhead danger where a runout could hit you). If you *have* to travel through avalanche terrain you do it one by one with big gaps. This is basic introduction course stuff.
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Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
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| Origen wrote: |
| If people set off on a route they correctly calculate carries only a low risk, a fatal avalanche doesn't mean they got that wrong. |
But they didn't correctly calculate it. On a level 4 day you don't traverse under that slope, especially when there are other options available (safer routes or just stay in the cabin). Even if you decide it's low enough risk you have to pass it one by one.
Go look at all the avalanche fatality full reports post investigation. The idea that people make all the correct decisions and just get caught out by something nuanced or easily missed just doesn't happen. Most of the time you are scratching your head thinking what on earth were they thinking, did they not even look at the forecast before setting out. It's no calculation rather than wrong calculation. Of course easier with hindsight, but often they are the most basic of errors.
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Poster: A snowHead
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| boarder2020 wrote: |
But they didn't correctly calculate it. On a level 4 day you don't traverse under that slope, especially when there are other options available (safer routes or just stay in the cabin). Even if you decide it's low enough risk you have to pass it one by one.
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Based on the NYT interview of two survivors, it sounded to me like they may well have been unaware of the overhead risk on the route they chose due to poor visibility and lack of familiarity with that particular route.
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Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
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I find it interesting how in the thread about the climbers girlfriend dying and him being charged with negligence most people were very critical of him. In this thread you have qualified professional guides messing it up and people are going the opposite way and trying to justify their mistakes.
@Tom_Ski, sorry but a huge storm was forecast before setting off. The guides should have taken that into account and planned a route out avoiding avalanche terrain completely as a back up plan (it seems there were options for this). They should have known the risks of the route they decided to take (plenty of mapping apps with avalanche overlays would have made this quite clear).
It's another case where the snow science gets it absolutely right, so there is little to speculate about regarding the avalanche itself. Maybe if it was natural and they got really unluckily, or they triggered it, but either way it was human error to be in that place. So the question becomes why they made those decisions to be there, which rightly or wrongly is why people will speculate about it.
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Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
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Fair comments, @boarder2020. Interestingly, that particular guide outfit marketed itself as storm chasers, getting their clients into the best pow. Completely agree - failure to plan contingencies beforehand.
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| boarder2020 wrote: |
| I find it interesting how in the thread about the climbers girlfriend dying and him being charged with negligence most people were very critical of him. In this thread you have qualified professional guides messing it up and people are going the opposite way and trying to justify their mistakes. |
A valid point, although the reverse is also true. Different incidents, different opinions.
Let me be clear though that I am not looking to justify their mistakes, I'm discussing why they may have made them.
As for the chap on Austria, I think actively ignoring a chance for rescue when the situation was clearly not good, and turning his phone to silent, is something which possibly lacks nuance.
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Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
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“
A monster winter storm was set to move in that night and drop up to eight feet of snow over four days. The local avalanche forecasting office warned of possible “widespread avalanche activity” and slides large enough to bury people in the days ahead. But the skiers viewed the weather not as a concern, but as a stroke of good luck.
“
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| Tom_Ski wrote: |
| boarder2020 wrote: |
But they didn't correctly calculate it. On a level 4 day you don't traverse under that slope, especially when there are other options available (safer routes or just stay in the cabin). Even if you decide it's low enough risk you have to pass it one by one.
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Based on the NYT interview of two survivors, it sounded to me like they may well have been unaware of the overhead risk on the route they chose due to poor visibility and lack of familiarity with that particular route. |
On a high avalanche risk day, you surely should not be guiding people onto a route you are not familiar with????
You need to kn0ow where the riskiest points are, to be able to traverse them with big gaps (or preferably avoid them).
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I’m surprised (not!) that people would put so much weight on their own speculation based on just ONE article from a newspaper (albeit a reputable one) based on interview with only 2 of the 6 survivors.
Basically, we know NOTHING! Yet, we all suddenly become avalanche AND human behavior experts.
Disgusting!
Sure, when the final report of the investigation eventually come out, you all will feel vindicated because one or even more then one points in your speculation were right! But remember, a stopped clock is right twice a day. I would speculate there will be multiple factors involved. Therefore, every one of these speculation will “fit”.
Hint #1: I’ve been following this incident since the day it happened. Even what were thought “facts” had changed over those days! Why? Because with only 2 witnesses (the guide and 1 client), their recollection of the events leading up to that moment were limited and fragmented.
Hint #2: There were NO “safe” route back to the highway that doesn’t involve crossing SOME avalanche terrain. Though there were alternate routes that probably are SAFER, with LESS risk.
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You'll get to see more forums and be part of the best ski club on the net.
You'll get to see more forums and be part of the best ski club on the net.
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| SnoodyMcFlude wrote: |
| boarder2020 wrote: |
| I find it interesting how in the thread about the climbers girlfriend dying and him being charged with negligence most people were very critical of him. In this thread you have qualified professional guides messing it up and people are going the opposite way and trying to justify their mistakes. |
A valid point, although the reverse is also true. Different incidents, different opinions.
Let me be clear though that I am not looking to justify their mistakes, I'm discussing why they may have made them.
As for the chap on Austria, I think actively ignoring a chance for rescue when the situation was clearly not good, and turning his phone to silent, is something which possibly lacks nuance. |
I tried to explain how the climber could make his mistakes and that it's pretty common for people to behave in completely erratic ways in extreme situations and when summit fever is involved. I also tried to explain that turning radios off is more common than you probably realise in mountaineering and somebody else pointed out that turning away helicopter rescue due to lack of insurance is a thing. Most in the thread were completely unwilling to accept any reasoning why, going as far to speculate he was an abusive partner and willingly left her there (even though the judges verdict - which was already known - said the opposite about willingly leaving her).
The big difference for me in this case is 4 professional guides with paying clients and access to their hq which could provide intel Vs one guy who's not a guide out with a partner. Personally i think expected standards for the 4 pro guides have to be considerably higher. Which is why I find it strange people seem to be much more willing to give them the benefit of the doubt trying to find reasons why they made the decisions they did than the climber in the other case.
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| boarder2020 wrote: |
What makes this so different?
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What makes this so different is only 2 survivors were interviewed, the guide wasn’t talking. So even the “facts” were from people who weren’t there!
Also what makes this so different is YOU are not just speculating, you phrased your speculation as done deal. Frankly, the past few days, I’ve seen too many know-it-all came up with perfectly good theories fitting the “known facts”, only to be shut down because the “facts” changed. As you hypothesized in the climber’s case, people in extreme conditions behave differently. So the recollection of the survivor is bound to change over the short period of time we’ve had.
I understand people wishes to speculate. So do I. But speculating isn’t the same as pinning speculative blame on people who can’t defend themselves. Keep in mind, one guide survived. But he’s not responding to these fury of questions by some desk jockeys. Smart. (Or he’s got a smart lawyer)
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snowHeads are a friendly bunch.
snowHeads are a friendly bunch.
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@abc, you were happy to say this about a dead woman who can't defend herself and the whole incident had only 1 witness, who has a huge bias in defending himself:
""In reality, the woman probably didn’t know what she’s gotten herself into due to lack of experience. But sometimes mother knows more. It’s also quite possible the woman was a head strong type who repeatedly ignore advices to turn around?"
Now you want to criticise others for speculation without enough facts?! Give it a break, you are just as bad as the rest, stop trying to claim some moral high ground.
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pinning speculative blame on people who can’t defend themselves
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The guides are to blame. Its not speculative. Even for non-professionals it is basic knowledge to travel through avalanche terrain one by one. We can discuss if better options were available - different route or staying put in the cabin. But the fact they were so close together is what caused this tragedy and should have been avoided. You can discuss/speculate "why" but it doesn't really matter other than perhaps being a learning point for others.
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And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
And love to help out and answer questions and of course, read each other's snow reports.
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@boarder2020, I am not sure there is enough information yet to say that the guides were negligent. They had decided on a safer route option, and we don't know how they came to be bunched together.
We all agree that travel through avalanche terrain should be one by one. But this is EXTREMELY difficult to do with a sizeable group in a whiteout.
First it is difficult to see exactly where you are relative to a dangerous slope. You need to be able to pause in a safe area before reaching the exposed slope, and also to be able to identity a safe zone for regrouping beyond the slope.
Then when there is a lot of fresh snow falling, so that tracks get covered quickly, you also need to be confident that your clients won't miss the tracks when covering say 500m of open terrain in 10m visibility, and get lost. You don't want to be doing a lot of shouting or making other loud noises.
Add in that the guides at the front were probably breaking trail, so even if the clients set out across a slope at timed intervals (not being able to see when those ahead had reached a safe zone) it is easy to see how they could have gradually bunched up. And even that doesn't allow for one person having an equipment failure or medical episode, and those behind catching up.
The only way to cross such terrain safely in those conditions is probably for the guides to have two-way radios, to know precisely where a danger slope begins and the safe zone starts, and then to only send a second client across once the previous one has reached it. But that also creates new risks: if it takes 10 minutes to cross the slope (moving uphill) you will have some clients standing around in sub-zero temperatures for two hours, and the weather may be deteriorating further.
I would rather wait to apportion blame until we know more.
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@ecureuil, I had been wondering how the group could be marshalled in a whiteout. Thanks for explaining the difficulties so clearly.
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You know it makes sense.
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| Origen wrote: |
| If people set off on a route they correctly calculate carries only a low risk, a fatal avalanche doesn't mean they got that wrong. |
I do think people forget this. Low risk does not mean no risk. However, in this case, I am not sure "low risk" is an accurate descriptor.....
I also think people think they are good decision makers when they haven't been avalanched. However, avalanches are pretty rare and one could eaily have strayed into avalanche terrain and been lucky. The feedback loop is either:
- No avalanche, I'm really good at reading the snowpack, using the forecast etc
- Avalanche, I'm dead so the feedback is irellevant
- Avalanche, I survive and learn something
Most of us get a lot of the first loop and sometimes were think we are more skilled than we are, instead of us being luckier than we realise.
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Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
Otherwise you'll just go on seeing the one name:
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| ecureuil wrote: |
The only way to cross such terrain safely in those conditions is probably for the guides to have two-way radios, to know precisely where a danger slope begins and the safe zone starts, and then to only send a second client across once the previous one has reached it. |
Surely they should have had two way radios? I have often been handed a radio by a guide when in a scenario where we will lose sight of each other, they need to check something out and feed that back to the group. Surely on a poor vis day they would be in the guides pack as a minimum?
(I know there was a lot more in your post but just wanted to pick up on this point)
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Poster: A snowHead
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| boarder2020 wrote: |
I tried to explain how the climber could make his mistakes and that it's pretty common for people to behave in completely erratic ways in extreme situations and when summit fever is involved. I also tried to explain that turning radios off is more common than you probably realise in mountaineering and somebody else pointed out that turning away helicopter rescue due to lack of insurance is a thing. Most in the thread were completely unwilling to accept any reasoning why, going as far to speculate he was an abusive partner and willingly left her there (even though the judges verdict - which was already known - said the opposite about willingly leaving her).
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I think the fact that previous girlfriends submitted statements of him leaving them and one former girlfriend testified in court that he had left her on the same mountain undermined a lot of his defense. A very unique case imho and somewhat irrelevant to the case we are discussing in which professional guides have a lot clearer duty of care.
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Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
Obviously A snowHead isn't a real person
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I'll be interested in learning why they chose not to sit out the storm in the huts. It doesn't appear that running out of food was an immediate issue, and the only other reason I've seen given was that the huts were fully booked and would've been needed for another group. However, that argument fails to take into account that in such a bad storm, no other group was going to make it up there that day anyway. Another reason could be that the huts themselves were not deemed safe from avalanche, but I've haven't seen any reference that suggests this.
| ecureuil wrote: |
| The only way to cross such terrain safely in those conditions is probably for the guides to have two-way radios, to know precisely where a danger slope begins and the safe zone starts, and then to only send a second client across once the previous one has reached it. But that also creates new risks: if it takes 10 minutes to cross the slope (moving uphill) you will have some clients standing around in sub-zero temperatures for two hours, and the weather may be deteriorating further. |
This is a good point that I hadn't appreciated, but to which the solution appears to be “split the group”. Though not at this point obviously, that would've needed to have been done in the planning stages.
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Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
Well, the person's real but it's just a made up name, see?
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I didn't say they didn't have radios. And I don't think we know whether they had started to cross the slope individually but something went wrong. But I do know that sending people out solo 500m uphill on featureless terrain in 10m visibility and rapidly obliterating tracks is also not without significant risk. (It is difficult enough to follow a familiar marked piste in such a whiteout). Once they left the cabins (which in hindsight may not have been the best decision at outset) they had to deal with conditions as they arose to the best of their collective ability.
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You need to Login to know who's really who.
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| boarder2020 wrote: |
| I also tried to explain that turning radios off is more common than you probably realise in mountaineering |
I find this interesting in that "people always do it" appears to be at odds with:
| boarder2020 wrote: |
| "it doesn't usually slide so it will be ok". I'd be critical of recreational skiers saying that, let alone "professionals". |
Surely both are equally inexcusable actions?
As with many things health and safety, the real issues are ultimately behavioural. I think we should be challenging these assumptions of "well it's normally okay" or "that's how it's always been done". The issue of summit fever or the deep powder equivalent is a big problem, the stoke is what can massively impair our decision making...but I hope that discussing it sensibly can impact how people take a step back and try to consider risks in front of them.
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Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
Anyway, snowHeads is much more fun if you do.
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| Quote: |
Low risk does not mean no risk
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And a fatal slide in genuinely "low risk" circumstances doesn't mean that somebody got it wrong.
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Directly in the path of the avalanche, the other 13 skiers were climbing a gentle slope through a clearing. Nearly all of them were bunched up behind the lead guides who were breaking trail. Mr. Auzans was last in line.
The skiers were not spread out to cross avalanche terrain. The clearing did not pose an obvious danger. The slope was only about 20 degrees — not steep enough for snow to slide. It remains unknown if, in the blowing snow, the guides realized that a steep slope towered just above them to the left.
The quote highlights how tightly grouped the skiers were. While the clearing itself was only around 20 degrees, the real hazard was the slope above them.
Storm conditions and blowing snow must have made visibility and group management challenging. Still, given that the return route had been planned that morning, and was essentially retracing their route in, it’s hard to imagine the overhead terrain wasn’t known.
In the end, the lack of spacing seems to have been the most consequential factor. When the slope released, nearly the entire group was exposed at once. The guide who wasn’t caught managed to rescue two women, but tragically ran out of time before reaching the third.
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Pretty sobering read over my lunchtime sandwich. It seems like the slopes they were moving over were considered but the slopes they moved under less so. I can envisage how the bunching happened in deep snow, bad weather and a desire to just get the f**k out of there but one would have hoped a guided group would have maintained a level of professionalism and order that an amateur group may not. My thoughts go to the family and friends of those who did not make it and hope those who survived get over it as well as is possible.
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| Origen wrote: |
| Quote: |
Low risk does not mean no risk
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And a fatal slide in genuinely "low risk" circumstances doesn't mean that somebody got it wrong. |
Go find me an avalanche fatality report where people were skiing in low risk conditions and made generally good decisions and simply got unlucky. There must be one out there, but I've not seen it. It's nearly always 3 or 4 out of 5 and avalanche caused by problems predicted by the forecast. Often numerous bad decisions, which you don't even need hindsight to realise were glaring errors.
Even on low risk days you should be travelling under avalanche terrain one by one. Again this was drilled into us on AST1 which is the most basic avy qualification in Canada. There are plenty of skin tracks that go through avalanche terrain and it's just basic stuff to go one by one. Of course you would be very unlucky for it to slide on a low risk day, but why take any chance. Also it's about getting into good habits.
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You'll get to see more forums and be part of the best ski club on the net.
You'll get to see more forums and be part of the best ski club on the net.
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| SnoodyMcFlude wrote: |
| boarder2020 wrote: |
| I also tried to explain that turning radios off is more common than you probably realise in mountaineering |
I find this interesting in that "people always do it" appears to be at odds with:
| boarder2020 wrote: |
| "it doesn't usually slide so it will be ok". I'd be critical of recreational skiers saying that, let alone "professionals". |
Surely both are equally inexcusable actions?
As with many things health and safety, the real issues are ultimately behavioural. I think we should be challenging these assumptions of "well it's normally okay" or "that's how it's always been done". The issue of summit fever or the deep powder equivalent is a big problem, the stoke is what can massively impair our decision making...but I hope that discussing it sensibly can impact how people take a step back and try to consider risks in front of them. |
Yes both are inexcusable, but both happen, although I would say the second is much more common than the first. I wasn't trying to "defend" the climber, I think the negligence verdict was fair, just put some of his actions in perspective. As I said before my expectations for someone who is not a professional guide out with a partner is a lot lower than a group of numerous professional guides with paying clients, so I will judge him with a lower bar. (That's just my opinion you are welcome to disagree and say they have equal responsibility).
| Quote: |
| However, that argument fails to take into account that in such a bad storm, no other group was going to make it up there that day anyway. |
I seem to remember reading a group did arrive that day taking the other road? Maybe am misremembering. I guess it's interesting to know what the groups heading in decided to do. I do think psychologically it's a bit easier to abandon on the outbound, whereas on the return there is the "just push through to get home" mentality.
@ecureuil agree, conditions can make things difficult. If the weather is truly that bad it's time to turn around and go back to the safe hut.
Ime most ski tourers have a GPS watch these days. Guides could provide a gpx route to the clients. This isn't something normally done, so it would be unfair to be critical of the guides over this. But in future it may be useful for navigating in a white out when needing to be spaced out. Also useful if for example if the group has to split e.g. guide stays with an injured person and the others can self navigate in less extreme conditions to the trail head.
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| abc wrote: |
I’m surprised (not!) that people would put so much weight on their own speculation based on just ONE article from a newspaper (albeit a reputable one) based on interview with only 2 of the 6 survivors.
Basically, we know NOTHING! Yet, we all suddenly become avalanche AND human behavior experts.
Disgusting!
Sure, when the final report of the investigation eventually come out, you all will feel vindicated because one or even more then one points in your speculation were right! But remember, a stopped clock is right twice a day. I would speculate there will be multiple factors involved. Therefore, every one of these speculation will “fit”.
Hint #1: I’ve been following this incident since the day it happened. Even what were thought “facts” had changed over those days! Why? Because with only 2 witnesses (the guide and 1 client), their recollection of the events leading up to that moment were limited and fragmented.
Hint #2: There were NO “safe” route back to the highway that doesn’t involve crossing SOME avalanche terrain. Though there were alternate routes that probably are SAFER, with LESS risk. |
Literally first hand accounts and an expert Dr Boilen. That’s not speculation.
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